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Introduction 
The tradition of interest in the presence of an axiological layer in language 
and its perception can be easily traced in Polish linguistics (see, among others, 
Krzeszowski (1989, 1990, 1997), Puzynina (1982, 1992), Kalisz (1981, 1993), 
Kalisz and Kubi ski (1993), Kleparski (1990, 1997), Kie!tyka (2008)). It is 
often claimed (see Kalisz, Kubi ski and Buller (1996:54)) that Krzeszowski 
(1989, 1990, 1997) […] created a new field of cognitive axiology where the 
dichotomy  or  a  scale  with  poles  good  –  bad  is  equally  and  may  be  more 
important  than  dichotomy/scale  true  –  false.  Curiously  enough,  the  author 
provides evidence that the axiological parameter seems to play a much more 
important role in meaning analyses than previously conceived. Krzeszowski 
(1989:9) argues for the presence of evaluation in image schemata of the part – 
whole kind, where the whole is most often perceived as positive while at a 
higher level of abstraction it is conceived as good. Central to his theory seems 
to be Krzeszowski’s (1990:150) axiological principle: Words have a tendency 
to be axiologically loaded with ‘good’ or ‘bad’ connotations in proportion to 
the  degree  of  the human factor associated with them. The idea behind this 
principle  is  that  metaphorical  expressions  are  more  prone  to  axiological 
polarity  than  non-metaphorical  ones.  For  example,  if  we  compare  a 
metaphorical context Peter is a hog and a non-metaphorical one Peter is a 
student,  we  will  certainly  notice  that  valuation  is  part  and  parcel  of 
mataphorisation;  in  that  it  is  the  former,  but  not  the  latter  context,  where 
axiology comes into play. Likewise, as pointed out by Krzeszowski (1997:51), 
the word dog, axiologically neutral when used in its directly meaningful sense 
becomes highly evaluative when used figuratively as in he is going to the dogs 
or to give/throw something to the dogs. In this paper, following Krzeszowski 
(1997),  we  will  make  an  attempt  to  show  the  pervading  presence  of  the 
axiological factor in conceptual metaphors of zoosemic type.  
 
36The Theory of The Great Chain of Being 
In their analysis of proverbs, Lakoff and Turner (1989:160–180) propose the 
tool termed the GREAT CHAIN METAPHOR (GCM) – a cognitive apparatus
1 
consisting  of  four  constitutive  ingredients:  the  Theory  of  Nature  of  Things 
(TNT), the GENERIC IS SPECIFIC metaphor (GISM), the Maxim of Quantity 
(MQ) and the Great Chain of Being (GCB) qualified as a cultural model. 
The first ingredient, the TNT, is regarded as a commonplace theory of forms 
of beings which are believed to […] have essences which lead to the way they 
behave or function (see Lakoff and Turner (1989:169)). Specifically, substances 
are  understood  as  having  essential  attributes  such  as  (HARD),  (HEAVY), 
(HIGH)  and  these  essential  physical  attributes  result  in  essential  physical 
behaviour  (e.g.  heavy  things  resist  movement).  Plants  are  additionally 
characterised by possessing essential biological natures which result in essential 
biological behaviour (e.g. certain kinds of flowers (BLOOM) in spring). Higher 
animals additionally display essential instinctive natures which lead to essential 
instinctive behaviour (e.g. cats (HUNT) mice). Finally, human beings are viewed 
as  possessing  essential  character  attributes  which  are  responsible  for 
characteristic behaviour (e.g. benevolent people (HELP) the needy). Thus, in 
short, the TNT is a commonplace theory of the relationship between attributes 
and behaviour typical of forms of being. 
According to Lakoff and Turner (1989:162), the second ingredient, namely, 
GENERIC  IS  SPECIFIC,  is  a  kind  of  metaphor  which  […]  maps  a  single 
specific-level schema onto an indefinitely large number of parallel specific-level 
schemas that all have the same generic-level structure as the source domain 
schema. Therefore, in other words, […] GENERIC IS SPECIFIC is a generic-
level metaphor which preserves the generic level-structure of the target domain 
[…] and imports as much as possible of the generic level structure of the source 
domain (Lakoff and Turner (1989:164)). 
The next ingredient employed in the internal structure of the GCM, that is 
the communicative MQ
2 is understood by Lakoff and Turner (1989:171) in the 
following way: Be as informative as is required and not more so. As the authors 
put it, […] its role is to limit severely what can be understood in terms of what 
(Lakoff  and  Turner  (1989:173)).  The  MQ  is  necessary  in  establishing  the 
mappings of information from one level of the chain to the other to the extent 
that only the highest-ranking properties available are mapped and superfluous 
information is not taken into consideration. For example, the context John is a 
lion  highlights  such  semantic  elements  as  (COURAGE),  (BRAVERY), 
 
1 On this issue see, among others, Krikmann (1994). 
2  The  MQ,  widely  employed  in  pragmatics,  emerges  from  Grice’s  (1975)  Cooperative 
Principle. 
 
37 (FEARLESSNESS) and the fact that lions have four legs, manes and tails is 
ignored and backgrounded due to the MQ. 
The  theoretical  bases  of  the  last  and  potentially  the  most  important 
ingredient, the concept of the GCB, were developed early on by such ancient 
philosophers  as  Plato  and  Aristotle  (cf.  Nisbet  (1982:35)),  and  it  is  worth 
mentioning that the GCB has not merely survived into our times but – more 
importantly – its mechanisms are reflected in various evolutionary theories and, 
recently, also in semantic investigations of natural languages. The basic GCB is 
defined  by  attributes  and  behaviours,  arranged  in  a  hierarchy.  The  extended 
version  of  the  GCB,  employed  in  axiological  semantics,  may  be  represented 
schematically in the following manner (Krzeszowski (1997:68)): 
 
Being        mode of existence    the highest property 
 
GOD        being in itself     divinity 
HUMANS      spiritual      reason/soul 
ANIMALS      animate      instincts 
PLANTS      vital        life 
INORGANIC THINGS  physical      material substance 
 
It seems relatively unimportant that the exact border lines between particular 
levels of the hierarchy may prove difficult to establish, e.g. bacteria are beings 
residing  somewhere  at  the  edge  of  flora  and  fauna,  whereas  viruses  are 
animate/inanimate  in  nature.  What  is  crucial,  however,  is  the  fact  that  the 
beings/entities belonging to respective levels of the hierarchy are characterised 
by features which distinguish a given level from lower levels. For example, as 
Krzeszowski  (1997:66)  puts  it,  rock,  sand,  water,  air  are  merely  substances, 
while man-made objects like ships, machines, cars, additionally, have a part-
whole functional structure. In turn, trees and other plants have substance, a part-
whole functional structure, and, additionally, life. Insects, fishes, mammals and 
other animals, apart from the properties typical of plants, have instincts, which 
are manifested in animal behaviour. Higher animals possess all these properties 
supported  by  such  interior  states,  as  desires,  emotions  and  certain  cognitive 
abilities. Humans have all the above mentioned properties, and – additionally – 
the ability of abstract thinking, reasoning, forming judgements, communicating 
through language and, last but not least, self-awareness. God is regarded as an 
absolute, omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient and perfect being, and – although 
not conceivable in any human terms – is in some religions credited with all the 
properties characterising all lower beings with an affinity of other properties – 
Being in Itself or Ultimate Being (see Krzeszowski (1997:67)).  
Ultimately, the mixture of the GCB and the Theory of Nature of Things 
results in a hierarchical folk theory of forms of being and how they behave which 
is depicted in Lakoff and Turner (1989:171) in the following way:  
 
38The TNT + The GCB 
HUMANS: Higher-order attributes lead to higher-order behavior 
ANIMALS: Instinctual attributes lead to instinctual behavior 
PLANTS: Biological attributes lead to biological behavior 
INORGANIC THINGS: Structural and natural physical attributes lead to structural and 
natural physical behavior 
 
Thus, these four ingredients, i.e. the TNT, the GCB, the GISM and the MQ 
constitute  the  so-called  GCM  which  is  […]  a  recurring  conceptual  complex 
made up of a metaphor, a commonsense theory, and a communicative principle 
(Lakoff and Turner (1989:171)). Given the five levels of the GCB presented 
above and the two possible directions of mapping, i.e. upward and downward, 
the number of all possible metaphors coherent with the GCB is altogether twenty 
(see  Krzeszowski  (1997:161)).  Specifically,  ten  of  these  metaphors  involve 
upward mapping, in which the source domain occupies a lower position on the 
GCB than the target domain, e.g. Peter is a pig (where being a pig implies being 
physically  and/or  morally  filthy).  In  turn,  the  other  ten  involve  downward 
mapping, in which the source domain occupies a higher position on the GCB 
than  the  target  domain,  e.g.  This  dog  is  loyal  and  friendly  (where  loyal  and 
friendly  are  features  typical  of  the  human  level  of  the  GCB).  Krzeszowski 
(1997:161) formulates the following set of metaphors:  
 
1. <GOD IS A HUMAN BEING>;
3  
2. <GOD IS AN ANIMAL>;  
3. <GOD IS A PLANT>;  
4. <GOD IS A THING>;  
5. <A HUMAN BEING IS AN ANIMAL>;  
6. <A HUMAN BEING IS A PLANT>;  
7. <A HUMAN BEING IS A THING>;  
8. <AN ANIMAL IS A PLANT>;  
9. <AN ANIMAL IS A THING>;  
10. <A PLANT IS A THING>;  
11. <A THING IS A PLANT>;  
12. <A THING IS AN ANIMAL>;  
13. <A THING IS A HUMAN BEING>;  
14. <A THING IS (A) GOD>; 
15. <A PLANT IS AN ANIMAL>;  
16. <A PLANT IS A HUMAN BEING>;  
17. <A PLANT IS (A) GOD>;  
18. <AN ANIMAL IS A HUMAN BEING>;  
 
3  See  Suchostawska  (2004)  for  a  very  revealing  analysis  of  the  metaphor  <GOD  IS A 
HUMAN BEING>. 
 
39 19. <AN ANIMAL IS (A) GOD>;  
20. <A HUMAN BEING IS (A) GOD>.  
 
As argued by Krzeszowski (1997), not all of the metaphors listed above are 
equally  productive,  and  some  may  prove  to  be  hard,  if  not  impossible  to 
materialise. In this paper we are mainly interested in two particular metaphors, 
namely  <A  HUMAN  BEING  IS AN ANIMAL>  and  <AN ANIMAL  IS A 
HUMAN  BEING>.  Thus,  an  attempt  is  made  to  show  that  features  can  be 
transferred from a higher level of the great GCB to a lower one, e.g. a faithful, 
friendly  dog,  or  from  a  lower  level  to  a  higher  one,  e.g.  This  man  is  a  pig 
(applied, usually contemptuously or opprobriously, to a person).  
Lakoff and Turner (1989:172) point out that the GCM is […] a tool of great 
power and scope because: 
[…] it allows us to comprehend general human character traits in terms of well-
understood nonhuman attributes; and, conversely, it allows us to comprehend less well-
understood  aspects  of  the  nature  of  animals  and  objects  in  terms  of  better-
understood human characteristics.  
Therefore, Lakoff and Turner (1989:195) make use of the mechanism of the 
GCB to explore the meaning of such metaphors as Achilles is a lion or Man is a 
wolf, i.e. metaphors of the form <A is a B> where B is a concept characterised by 
a metaphorical schema. In the metaphor Achilles is a lion certain instinctive 
traits of a lion are perceived metaphorically in terms of human character traits, 
such as courage.
4 The authors claim that the expression Achilles is a lion helps 
us to understand the character of Achilles in terms of a certain instinctive trait of 
lions,  a  trait  which  is  already […]  metaphorically  understood  in  terms  of  a 
character  trait  of  humans.  Interestingly,  to  use  Lakoff  and  Turner’s 
(1989:195) terminology, […] understanding the character of Achilles in terms 
of the instinct of the lion, asks us to understand the steadfastness of Achilles’ 
courage in terms of the rigidity of animal instinct. The authors argue that the 
mechanism  by  which  this  works  is  the  GCM.  In  the  case  in  hand, 
(STEADFASTNESS), being of higher-order character, is understood in terms of 
(RIGIDITY) of lower-order instinct.  
As noted by Krzeszowski (1997:80), […] people have a great tendency to 
ascribe higher values to various things and concepts at lower levels on the Great 
Chain  of  Being.  It  seems  understandable  that,  when  conceptualising  and 
valuating, we tend to perceive reality in terms of the human level. A tendency of 
this  kind  is  referred  to  as  anthropomorphisation  (humanisation)  and 
personification of entities above and below the human level on the GCB. It is 
true that humanisation can be expressed by means of valuations in that various 
 
4 On this issue see also Kleparski (1996). 
 
40animals are valued either positively (e.g. dog, puppy) or negatively (e.g. cur, 
mongrel) at the animate level of values. As argued by Krzeszowski (1997:81), in 
various cultures and languages different properties characterising animals may 
be  highlighted  and  metaphorically  mapped  on  the  human  level  of  the  GCB. 
According to Baider and Gesuato (2003:15), research on choices of metaphors 
within a given language confirms that each culture defines its own social reality. 
For  example,  in  French,  metaphorical  terms  cross  mapping  crustaceans  and 
sexuality  are  relatively  common:  crevette  ‘shrimp’  >  ‘darling  (a  term  of 
endearment, typically for a child), a female lover’; langoustine ‘a small lobster’ 
> ‘a female partner/lover’; pieuvre ‘an octopus’ > ‘a demanding mistress or kept 
woman’;  moule  ‘a  mussel’  >  ‘female  genitals’.  By  contrast,  such 
correspondences are – natuarally – not typical of Italian or Polish. 
As a rule, the properties which are mapped in particular metaphors are most 
frequently language-specific. For example, pigs have a bad reputation for being 
both filthy and gluttonous. Therefore, in Polish the abstract noun  wi!stwo ‘dirty 
trick’ derives from  winia ‘pig’, and it is understood as a mapping of animal 
instinctive behaviour (being (FILTHY) and (GLUTTONOUS)) on the level of 
human values to be perceived as human immoral behaviour (being (MORALLY 
FILTHY)). This operation involves an extension of values from the animate to 
the human level, as formulated by Krzeszowski (1997:81) […] from the level 
where instinctive behaviour is most salient to the human level, at which moral 
judgements give rise to the resulting values. On the other hand, the very same pig 
which symbolises dirtiness and greed in one culture is an attribute of strength for 
the Chinese and a symbol of luck for Germans, for whom the context Ich habe 
Schwein gehabt is understood as ‘I have had luck.’ Interestingly, as noted by 
Kleparski (1997:171), Mod.Czech žaba/žabka is used to denote girls and young 
women,  Mod.Pol.  "abka  ‘dim.  frog’  is  employed  with  reference  to  ‘a  loved 
woman,  sweetie’  in  a  similar  way  to  Polish  kotek  ‘dim.  cat,  pussy’  and 
secondarily  ‘honey,  sweetie,  a  term  of  endearment’,  while  its  Mod.Russ. 
equivalent #$%&'() ‘a frog’ is almost never used familiarly with reference to 
young  females  because  the  connotations  of  this  lexical  category  are  entirely 
different,  that  is,  those  of  (SLEAZINESS),  (COLDNESS).  Additionally,  in 
Mod.Russ.  the  lexical  category  koza  ‘a  goat’  associates  with  such  attributive 
values as (LIVELINESS) and (ENERGY), while Mod.G. Ziege ‘a goat’ connotes 
(NAIVETY), (STUPIDITY) and is close in meaning to Mod.Pol. baran ‘a ram’, 
osio*  ‘a  donkey’,  ciel+  ‘a  calf’  as  well  as  Mod.G.  Gans  ‘a  goose’  and 
Mod.Chinese zhu 勲‘a pig’ as in ben chun zhu 䆮/ 亨勲‘a stupid pig’ > ‘an 
idiot’, si zhu ㈁勲‘a dead pig’ > ‘a stupid person’. 
 On the other hand, notice that Mod.Pol. ropucha ‘a toad’ applied to ‘an old 
fat  and  ugly  woman’  has  similar  connotations  to  Mod.E.  toad  which  is 
secondarily used ‘as a term of insult for a person’. It is also interesting to note 
that  languages  choose  a  variety  of  animal  names  with  reference  to  certain 
 
41 occupations/professions. And so, the lexical categories pig, dog, bull and chicken 
can be used with reference to the police in a number of languages, e.g. Mod.E. 
(pig),  Mod.Pol.  (psy  ‘dogs’),  Mod.G.  (Bulle  ‘a  bull’)  and  Mod.Fr.  (poulet  ‘a 
chicken’);  Mod.Sl.  straka  ‘a  magpie’  used  in  the  sense  ‘a  thief’;  Mod.Sp. 
canguro ‘a kangaroo’ functions as ‘a babysitter’; Mod.Pol. pijawka ‘a leech’ is 
employed  to  denote  ‘a  lawyer’.  Other  concepts,  like  (STUPIDITY), 
(NAIVETY), (PROSTITUTION), (UGLINESS), are also frequently expressed 
with the aid of animal names, but language-specificity may be held responsible 
for certain differences, e.g. Mod.Hu. liba ‘a goose’, Mod.Russ. %&,- ‘a goose’, 
Mod.Pol. g+  ‘a goose’, Mod.G. Gans ‘a goose’ are used to convey the sense ‘a 
stupid  woman’;  Mod.Sp.  zorra  ‘a  vixen’  as  well  as  pájara  ‘a  female  bird’, 
Mod.Pol. mewka ‘(little) sea-gull’, Mod.Russ. .)./0() ‘a butterfly’, Mod.Hu. 
éjszakai  pillangó  ‘a  night  butterfly’  acquired  the  secondary  sense  ‘a 
prostitute/whore’; Mod.Sp. foca ‘a seal’ designates ‘a fat person, particularly a 
woman’, Mod.Fr. haridelle ‘an old horse’ is used with reference to ‘a thin and 
ugly woman’,
5 Mod.Pol. koby*a ‘(derogatively) mare’ metaphorically surfaces as 
‘a stupid, ugly woman’. Likewise, extensions of values from higher to lower 
levels  of  the  hierarchy  are  also  possible  and,  in  fact,  do  take  place  in  the 
mechanism of the GCB. For example, the conceptual elements (LOYALTY) and 
(BRAVERY)  are  primarily  related  to  the  human  level  of  values.  However, 
through the process of anthropomorphisation they can be extended downwards to 
the level of animals, which, in turn, makes it possible for us to refer to dogs as 
loyal (e.g. Polish To jest najwierniejszy pies jakiego kiedykolwiek mieli ‘This is 
the most loyal dog they have ever had’) and ostriches as cowardly (e.g. He is like 
an ostrich – always hides away from unpleasant reality). 
Conclusion 
The aim set to this paper was to shed some light on the presence of an 
axiological  layer  in  language,  the  working  of  the  Great  Chain  of  Being,  its 
(bi)directionality  and  implications,  as  well  as  the  fact  that  axiological 
values/features/elements are not viewed as bundles, but rather they are grouped 
into sets: positive, neutral, negative based on axiological marking (see Kleparski 
 
5 As  the  OED  informs  us,  English  harridan is generally supposed to be an alteration of 
Mod.Fr. haridelle ‘an old jade of a horse (16th century); also, a gaunt ill-favoured woman’ but 
connecting forms are not known. In the 18
th century this lexical item was employed in the sense ‘a 
haggard old woman; a vixen; a decayed strumpet, usually a term of vituperation’. The following 
OED quotations visualise the situation in hand. 
a1700 Harridan, one that is half Whore, half Bawd.   
a1745 The nymphs with whom you first began, Are each become a harridan.  
 
42(1990, 1997), Kie!tyka (2008)). Thus, the structure of the GCB is characterised by 
its  bi-directionality  which  involves  upward  and  downward  mapping  of 
features/attributes. In the case of upward mapping the source domain occupies a 
lower position on the GCB than the target domain. On the other hand, downward 
mapping involves the transfer of features/attributes from the source domain which 
occupies a higher position on the GCB than the target domain. As shown above, 
the number of all possible metaphors coherent with the GCB is twenty, out of 
which two, i.e. <A HUMAN BEING IS AN ANIMAL> and <AN ANIMAL IS A 
HUMAN BEING>, were briefly examined. It remains to be hoped that the future 
will bring more studies devoted to the axiological layer in language which would 
examine the other eighteen metaphors pertaining to the structure of the GCB.  
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